Reasons of the arrival of the immigrants of Spain

The INE has just published a quite interesting information about the immigrants in Spain obtained from the Survey of Active Population. It is a question of the correspondent to the module "situation of the immigrants and of his children as regards the labor market", with information of 2008. Throw a glance, it has enough that to see.
What more has attracted attention of me has been the question on the principal reason for which the interviewees (persons from 16 to 74 years) have come to Spain. Regrouping groups of nationalities and reasons (since some of them are very little numerous), the boss of principal reasons of the foreigners, for sexes and nationality, it is the one that two following graphs show.
Let's see first the case of the males (click in the graph to extend it).

Since they can observe (if they extend the graph), the most adduced principal reason, independently of the nationality (of the group of nationalities, rather) it is coming to work, without having I use previously, a little that 54 % of the foreigners mentions. There are relatively small those who say to have come to work counting previously with an employment in Spain (or his company has moved them), 13 %. What means that, of which they come to work, close to 80 % it came without contract of employment and then, probably, it found work. Not at all that we surprise.

Yes it attracts attention that the reason of coming to work without previous employment in Spain is mentioned by more males of the "rest of the world" (69 %). In fact, immense most of them are Moroccan and, less, sub-Saharan, although there will be some Asians. Logically, they are those who less mention the reasons, let's say, of familiar regrouping (11 %, opposite to 19 % of the whole of foreign males of the ages on that we comment).
Let's see now the case of the women (again, click to extend).

The first thing that hits in the eye if we compare the second graph with the first one is that the women mention less the reasons tied of the search of work (43 vs 66 % for the males) and more those of familiar regrouping or family formation (41 vs 19 % for the males). Nothing that does not also surprise although the differences are not abysmal.

Only they it are, relatively, for a nationalities group, those of the "rest of the world" (remember, especially, Moroccan, sub-Saharan and some Asians). There are small the women who come for work (28 %) and many those who come for familiar reasons (64 %). Again, nothing that we were not suspecting, but the empirical assertion always comes well :-)

It improves (a little) the perception of the economic situation, but not that of the politics

CIS has published today the barometer corresponding to June. I am useful to update the graphs on the economic situation and the political situation, which makes great that I do not do it.
First, the graph of perception of the economic situation (click in the graph to extend it).

As it is observed, the judgment on the current economic situation continues in levels bajísimos, although last months they suggest a minimal progress. What yes it improves clearly is the forecast of the economic situation in one year. For the first time in enough months they are so many people those who believe that the thing will go to better like those who believe that it will go to worse. Partly it was foreseeable: we have come so below that nobody "in his healthy judgment" can think that we are still going to deteriorate more (or not?).
Let's see now the perception of the political situation.

The perception of the political situation (line fuchsia), nevertheless, is supported in low levels, without a progress being observed: badly for the government, skylight. Anyhow, we are not in the levels of the year 1995. For the opposition of the PP it paints well, also, the fact of the average ideological autoplace, which tends to be located in the last months in levels more to the right than in the previous years. It does not surprise that in any surveys, the PP appears a little ahead of the Spanish socialist party, not that was winning, for other little, in the European elections.

Employment public and deprived in the last two crises

They already know that today there have been published the results of the Survey of Active Population corresponding to the second trimester of 2009. Also they know that the occupation has fallen down in approximately 145.000 persons between this trimester and the first one of the year, and that the unemployment has increased, in the same period, in more than 125.000 persons. One, between enough, of the information that it attracts attention is that the occupation has kept on falling down in the private sector (almost in 170.000 occupied ones), while it has kept on raising the number of occupied in the public sector (in more than 20.000).
Public and private employment they support a divergent evolution in the last trimesters. Did the same happen in the crisis of beginning of the nineties of last century? We can observe it in the following graph (click to extend).

In the graph I have recounted the employment rates to the existing ones in the trimester of maximum occupation (3rd of 1991, 3rd of 2007), taking a basic number of 100. The graph shows the information of this trimester 0 and seven following ones. Since we know, the employment is falling down now more than in the nineties, something that is even more accentuated in case of the private employment.
Nevertheless, to the heights of the seventh month maximum post-employment, the public employment places 4 % over the level that had in the trimester 0, while in the crisis of the nineties the public employment was located in 2 % for below. Although in this graph the interannual change is not included, the public employment is growing now to 3,7 %, while then it was doing it to-1,6 % (this is, it was falling down). The difference is very notable.
The current government, at this point of the movie, for this way saying it, as we know, it is impelling very much the public expenditure, probably more that the socialistic government did it, to the same heights of the movie of the employment, in the nineties. Partly it will do it for conviction, partly, for political opportunity, and, partly, also for the judgment that they have on his maneuver margin. I am given me by the impression of which they are thinking about having it major than the one that the Socialists had at the beginning of the nineties. If it is like that, his judgment has a real basic minim in the evolution of the economic indicators in the previous trimesters.
At a height of the 2nd trimester of 1993, looking backwards, the leaders of the moment saw a panorama of big growth of the expense and the public employment, especially from 1989, and as a result, partly, from the authorizations to the trade unions "victorious" in the general strike of December, 1988. The growth of the public employment for then can turn in the following graph.

Since they see, the public employment was growing to interannual valuations that came to a maximum of 10 % in the third trimester of 1989, with seven trimester growing over 5 % interannual. So much I use and spend publics did that the public deficit and the public debt were growing enormously in proportion of the PIB.En the actuality, the increases of the public expenditure in the last years have not had the same effects in the public accounts, since it even does relatively little these were supported in balance or, even, in surplus, and the weight of the public debt on the GDP, also till not long ago, it was descending. The public employment has not also grown so much as then, how one sees in the graph.
The government looks backwards and he is thinking about having maneuver margin, how, on the other hand, he has affirmed in multiple occasions; I do not discover anything new.
And forward? Is there this maneuver margin? That is different to sing, skylight, and anyone starts today doing predictions, but the employment information to himself, tabién public, of the crisis of 1993 they suggest that the maneuver margin is narrow. It it seems, at least. Watch Southland S02E03 U-Boat online

Several ways of measuring the unemployment in Spain

Recently, when new numbers appear on the unemployment in Spain, like today, diverse measurements of the above mentioned phenomenon usually confront, generally to benefit of the argument that the one who handles them wants to do. Published in Spain there is at least three.
1. The numbers of unemployment that measures the Survey of Active Population (EPA).
2. The numbers of registered unemployment prepared by the Public Service of State Employment (SPEE), of the Department of Labour.
3. The numbers of Claimants of Employment not Busy (denos), which also there publishes the above-mentioned Public Service of State Employment.
According to the EPA in his current version,

There will be considered to be stops all the persons of 16 or more years that the following conditions should assemble simultaneously:
- without work, that is to say, that they have taken an employment neither as a foreign account nor as proper account during the week of reference.
- in search of work, that is to say, that they have taken concrete measures to look for a work for foreign account or have done negotiations to be established by his account during the previous month.
- available for being employed, that is to say, at conditions it to begin to do within a period of two weeks from Sunday of the week of reference.
Also there consider stops the persons of 16 or more years that during the week of reference have been without work, available for working and that do not look for employment because they have already found one which they will join in three months later to the week of reference. Therefore, in this case there is not demanded the criterion of effective search of employment.
The absent persons of the work as a consequence of a suspension for regulation who are not considered to be busy, this is that whose employer pays to them less than 50 per cent of his salary and that are going to rejoin to his employment after last three months, they are stopped if they have looked for work and are available for redeeming it.

For the SPEE, the principal concept is that of claimant of employment:

Claimants are the workpeople who register in the public services of employment for the search of an employment or to improve the one that they already possess (labor intermediation), to receive other services foreign to the employment (orientation for the self-employment, occupational formation,). or for the obligatory nature to register to perceive a contributory service or a subsidy.

Obviously, not all the claimants of employment are stopped. To obtain the number of registered unemployment it is necessary to withdraw the number of claimants the numbers that certain groups represent.
The employment claimants with limited availability. This category seems to include, first, the claimants who have no availability to work (they request services foreign to the employment, they request self-employment, claimants with demand suspended without intermediation), second, that they have a low availability (demands suspended with intermediation, pensioners, pensioners), and, third, to they demand specific work places (of work only to domicile, of telework, of work only abroad, emigrants with will of return, of work only out of his residence community...).
The busy employment claimants. This category groups different groups of workpeople who have work but they demand an employment: percipients of services assigned in works of social collaboration, hard-working with records of regulation of employment, fixed workpeople discontinuous, and affiliated to the Social security in the general or autonomous systems.
Other not occupied employment claimants. The agrarian possible workpeople are, on one hand, subsidized (or TEASS) and, for other one, a hodgepodge that it includes: that there ask for a work that should last less than three months (relating to the moment employment), which demand a day lower than 20 (part-time) weekly hours, the students younger than 25 years or who demand the first employment if they have more than 25 years, and the claimants of services before to the employment.
The claimants of employment not gathered in the previous groups represent the registered unemployment. The claimants' sum with limited availability and the denos category is other not occupied employment claimants.
Since they know, the information of the EPA is quarterly, while those of registered unemployment and denos are published every month. To compare them, I have used quarterly averages for the last two measurements.
See in the following graph the information from 1996 (year in which the homogeneous series of registered unemployment begins) up to the second trimester of 2009. Bear in mind that in the series of EPA there are two significant ruptures, one in 2001 and other one in 2005. And bear in mind, also, that a part of the information of denos (2001 until April, 2005, I believe) is reestimations carried out at a later stage. They know already, click in the graph to extend it.

Apparently three measurements continue a similar, but not identical evolution. The unemployment EPA starts by being clearly superior to the registered unemployment, until it changes the criterion EPA in 2001 and both are located in very similar levels. With the new change of crierio EPA in 2005, the numbers of unemployment EPA are lower than those of registered, safe unemployment with the current crisis, in which, without change of any criterion, the unemployment EPA is clearly superior again to the registered one. Do not ask why.

For his part, the number of denos is almost parallel to that of registered unemployment, although, obviously, as it includes more groups, it is top, in approximately 400.000 persons in the years with which both series coincide. In the last trimester (2nd of 2009), the number of unemployment EPA (4.137.500) is more similar to that of denos (4.073.620) that to that of registered unemployment (3.609.969), but it seems to be a mere coincidence, since in previous trimesters the opposite happened.

The fact internationally comparable is, as they know, that of the EPA, even with the changes of criterion that we have seen. Others two give us a slightly more relating to the moment (monthly) track. The panorama that the three draw is, in not very thin, similar line, although there are sudden changes in the relation between EPA and others two that the specialists will have to explain on Spanish labor market.

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Question of (economic) confidence

A part of the current economic discussion in Spain has to do with the expectations of evolution of the economic situation. Since it is of waiting, the government insists on highlighting the information of the economic reality that, seemingly, point at changes of tendency, and the critics are in charge of insisting on the still very low levels of these indicators. In the same way, the government fights as to a nail burning to the information of opinion that reflect a change of tendency (towards the progress) in the expectations of evolution of the personal economy and the Spaniard in general.
In the above mentioned, in that thing about the expectations of the people, the government it takes those of winning, although it is only because the judgment on the economic situation and these expectations they deteriorated so much that éra almost impossible that they were deteriorating more, at least as they measure themselves in the surveys.
I revise next in detail some of these indicators, relative to the confidence of the consumers (this is, of the public in general). I use the published ones by the European Commission, since they usually attend to little in Spain. The graphs that they continue are prepared by public information proceeding from this page (1).
Let's begin for the indicator consisted of confidence of the consumer that there publishes the DG Finance of the European Commission. Let's remember that it is based on four questions relative to the future economic evolution and her spent, whose detail we will see further on.

It is quite clear that the confidence of the consumers, like that measurement, is improving, both in the set of the European Union and in Spain, departing from levels "historically" very low in both cases, especially in Spanish. For Spain, the indicator would have returned at the levels of March, 2008, a moment in which this index was already falling down.
More interesting that this aggregate indicator can be to be fixed in the individual indicators that compose them and other questions not included in the indicator of confidence. We see them for the Spanish case.
Let's see first the relative ones to the financial situation of the hearth.
Since the judgment is seen on the financial situation of last year scarcely it mends, continuing in levels bajísimos, but the evolution expectations improve quickly. Really, the expectations had fallen down very much, to historical minimums, much underneath of those of the crisis of 1993.
Secondly, the judgment on the general economic situation in Spain.

Almost we can repeat the previous comment, therefore I will not do it :-)
Of the previous indicators, there intervene in the shape of the indicator of confidence those of expectations of evolution of the situation of the hearth and of Spain, not those of the past situation. Next we see another indicator that is not considered in this index, not in his version "towards the past" not in his "future" version. I refer to the perception of the behavior of the prices to the consumption.
The evolution of the indicator looks of reflecting the news on the IPC that are taking place month a month, although I have not verified it. It be fixed that, in recent times, it begins collapsing (that is to say, more and more people begin saying that the prices will not rise), I joust when the IPC begins collapsing in Spain, this is, in the last trimester of 2008. Or perhaps the fact is that, really, the nations began feeling in his daily buys this prices fall. Who knows. That should move so in parallel he makes me think that the future forecast depends very much of the current or past situation, and does not serve too much to watch what is going to happen with the prices.
Quarter, something seemed happens in case of the forecast of the evolution of the unemployment in one year.
It gives the impression of which the interviewees answer according to the most recent news about evolution of the unemployment. What is clear is that the expectations, even being denials, it are not so much like eight months ago. This indicator yes is used in the compound indicator.
In fifth place, let's see other questions that are not used in the compound indicator, relative to the predisposition to carry out buys called major, like electrical or electronic devices, furniture...

For the prompt thing, we observe that those who were saying that it was not the moment adapted for this type of buys ended up by being overcome by them in much those who yes believed it about November, 2008, although since then the forces have re-balanced enough in favor of the second ones. For his part, the predisposition to spend more in this type of buys the next year also fell down to minimums, but the subsequent recovery has been small, what he suggests that there will be supported the moderation of the familiar expense.
Finally, let's see the opinions about the saving. On this matter, we are provided with three questions. The first one refers to if the current moment is good or bad to save.

I do not know if there is any rupture of the series at the end of 2001, but, if it is not, it is clear that, since then, the opposite opinions to (very bad moment, not good moment to save) have tended to overcome the favorable ones (very good moment, quite good moment to save), coming the indicator at a few minimal levels about June, 2008. Later, it gives the impression of which the people have chosen to press the belt, recovering this indicator the levels of six years behind in May, 2009. Since then, nevertheless, it has fallen down again, and enough. Perhaps for the notable fall of the interest rates in the last months. The second one refers to the saving expectations next year, other of the subindicators of the index of confidence of the consumer.

The balance between those that they were estimating like probable to save in 12 following months and those who were considering it not probable began collapsing from October, 2007, more or less the date in which the indicator of already seen saving experienced the penultimate fall. The indicator fell down to his historical minimums, recovering again about the spring of this year, and being located at present in levels similar to those of the summer 2007.
The last question refers to the financial situation of the hearth at present. The indicator reflects the balance between those who say to save (great or small) and those who are "desahorrando" or incurring debts.

Since this balance is seen it deteriorated very much from May / June, 2008, going over to minimums, almost historical, at the beginning of the year 2009. Since then a shy recovery is observed. In general, it gives the impression of which the indicators on the situation current or past continue in quite negative levels, even having improved something from the minimums. On contrary, the questions on what it is waited (he wishes?) of the future reflect a major enough recovery. As he was saying to them at first, some and other politicians will insist on a few or other indicators as they should serve to them. Here, in Wonkapistas, we all offer them to him so that you do your own place composition to themselves.
__________ (1) they count The construction of the indicators here.

Recent evolution of the IPC and the wages

The INE has just published the provisional information of the harmonious labor cost, a common estimation of the labor costs for the countries of the European Union. The information includes also the harmonious wage cost, which comes to be the labor cost less social quotations, grosso way. These costs are measured bearing in mind the really worked hours. It gives the impression from which the information covers all the activity sectors.
The information is quarterly and 100 present before themselves in the shape of index, with base in 2008, and it offers three estimations, the gross series, the corrected one of the effect calendar and the corrected one of calendar and of seasonal nature. The last one seems to reflect better the reality of the evolution of the wages. We can compare this evolution with the evolution of the prices, taking the series of the IPC, also in his harmonious version. The information of the IPC is monthly, but it is easy to turn them in quarterly, taking the average of the trimester.
The following graph includes the interannual changes of both indexes, in percentage.

Apparently in the second trimester of 2009, the wages / hour were growing to an interannual rhythm of 5,4 %, while the IPC would have been doing it to-0,7 %, therefore, this way measured, the wages of the workpeople who have supported his employment during this crisis would be gaining enough purchasing power. In the previous trimester, the respective changes were 3,5 and 0,5 %, what also was implying a purchasing power profit.

In fact, in this series, which it covers from the first trimester of 2001 up to the second one of 2009 (34 trimesters), the growth of the wages has been a Superior to that of the IPC in 22 trimesters (and low in 12, skylight). As a whole, between the first trimester of 2000 and the second trimester of 2009 the wage index would have grown 46 %, while the prices index only would have grown 32 %.

Update

The first (anonymous) commentator must have part of reason. It is not possible to compare as cheerfully as I have done it between two trimesters in which the structure of the employment for wages level can have changed significantly. Anyhow, as thick indication of how much must they be raising the wages of those who work, also can take the wage rise agreed in the agreements, and speech, again, of a progress probably substantially of purchasing power. In the registered ones until July, the annual increase is 2,7 %, with a minimal change of the day. Again, let's remember that it is a "thick" track and it would be necessary to bear in mind the covered sectors.

On the other hand, if we calculate the change of the wage cost between 1t2000 and 4t2007, before the big fall of the employment (and, therefore, of the big fall of the temporary employment, with wages lower than the average), we see that 36 % increased, while the IPC made it 29 %. Bearing in mind that many of the workpeople who joined to the labor market in these years did it in low wage levels (the foreigners, for example), there is observed a clear profit of purchasing, measured power of a "thick" way as we can do it, although clearly lower than the one that is the result of comparing the whole period.

Eight of every ten unsatisfied Spanish with his work?

I do not know how, but I keep on being astonished at the capacity that some have statistical data of the top hat are extracted. The coach (?) and journalist Sergio Fernández, according to an interview published in The Avant-garde, affirms:

8 of every 10 Spanish is unsatisfied with his work. The persons' quantity that gets up every tomorrow about going to a work for which nothing sits, is very big. If it was touching them the lottery they would stop working on the following day.

I do not say that there is no great one (how much?) the people that go to the work in the conditions that affirm the "coach", but that thing about "8 of every 10" it have extracted of the sleeve. Which is not an impediment so that The Avant-garde takes this supposed fact to the holder.
Let's see what says the last Survey of Quality of life in the Work (2008), the best with which we are provided, precisely, to measure this type of things, since it is a question of a survey representative of the busy ones, with a quite wide sample and with pertinent questions on this matter.
One asks the busy one to indicate his satisfaction grade in his current work, in a scale that goes from 0 (void satisfaction) to 10 very high (satisfaction). The average that is obtained is 7,3. It does not look like a low average, the truth. As there classify the results of this question who prepare the stage that appear on the web page of the Department of Labour, the answer this way (1) would be distributed:
- very satisfied: 19,9 %
- satisfied: 53,1 %
- neither unsatisfied nor satisfied: 24,7 %
- very unsatisfied / unsatisfied: 2,3 %
Certainly, we might think that all those who do not fall down in the category of "very satisfied" would be not satisfied. Only this way we would obtain the percentage of 80 % of unsatisfied.
Eye: this is an only one satisfaction measurement. Hangover, like that they usually provide the surveys. Anyhow, throw a glance to other results of the ECVT. They will obtain a richer idea of the question of the job satisfaction with which they provide the extracted statistics of the top hat, although it is of the top hat of a "coach".
_____
(1) Since I do not have the information file, I cannot know what punctuations they include in every category. Yes I have that of the survey of 2004, which offers very similar results, although the question is not exactly equal. The scale goes from the 1 (very unsatisfied) (very satisfied) to 10. The answers, removing the "ns/nc" (very small) are:
1: 1,7 %
2: 1,0 %
3: 2,1 %
4: 4,9 %
5: 9,1 %
6: 12,9
7: 16,7 %
8: 32,1 %
9: 10,8 %
10: 8,9 %
The average would be 7,1.

Recent numbers of housing construction

Making use that the Department of the Housing has published the numbers of initiated and finished housings of the second trimester of the year, I have thought of updating my series of housing construction and of offering them the graphs, which some time ago that I do not do it.
We begin for that of the housings that will be constructed, this is, for the number of visas of direction of work (new work, especially, but also enlargement or reform) expressed by the Schools of Technical Architects. They know already, click in the graphs to see them well.

As it is observed that the number of visas was located in May (last available fact) almost, or without almost, in the rock bottoms of the series from 1978, in levels similar to those of sixteen years ago, in 1993. It is as if the market of the new housing had stepped back three periods of five years.

The rhythm of interannual fall of these visas keeps on being very high, of-51,8 % in May.

Certainly, if there are so few visas, they will not begin constructing many housings either. Since the monthly initiated number of housings is seen in the following graph also it is in almost historical minimums, scarcely 3.000 monthly housings more than in the minimums of the crisis of 1993.

The interannual rhythms, skylight, keep on being of intense fall.

The fall also ends up by being observed in the numbers of completed housings, although, for the temporary phase lag between his beginning and his end, it is not yet so intense how in the initiated ones. Let's see it first in absolute terms.

And now, in interannual changes.

Also we can adopt a perspective more limited in the time, more proper of the discussion political and more beaten to the economic conjuncture and to the conversation on green sprouts and other grasses. In the following graph we have the housings information visadas, initiated and completed turned to an index that 100 adopts the value in December, 2006, a date next to the recent maxima of the construction. This way we will be able to see, grosso way, how much has fallen down the market from these maxima.
The numbers of housings visadas and initiated, which offer us the best indicator of the evolution to shortly of the market, are located in 20 % of those of December, 2006. Namely they would have fallen down 80 %. The excesses are paid... It is showy that, more or less, these numbers are "flat" from January. Not green shoots here, move on! Perhaps they are in the months not gathered in the statistics, but we will only find out at the end of year.

The debt of the Spanish town halls, especially of one... (curious graphs LXXXIV)

For reasons that do not come to the case, I have come to the page of the Spanish Bank that gathers the information of the debt of the local corporations. The temptation of preparing a graph with the evolution of the debt of the town halls, especially of that one that you already know, it has been irresistible. Here they have them, almost without comments, and without major making (1).
First, a graph in which this debt differs for several capitals of province and for the rest of these capitals. It is expressed in thousands of euros.

And second, a graph in which there is contemplated the same information as percentage of the whole of the debt of the Spanish municipalities.

It is quite clear what the odd man out is.
___ (1) to appreciate the volume of the debt of every town hall would be convenient, like little, to divide it by the number of inhabitants. And to turn it into constant currency. I leave it for another moment. What I am interested in here is to show the evolution in the short and half term, that, for the case that occupies us, there depends little of the size of the population or of the deflators.

Today it touches the debt of the Autonomous regions

As the graphs of the public debt of the town halls have been certainly successful in the small world of the blogs, forums and the others, perhaps the Wonkapistas readership is interested in also a few similar graphs with information of the CCAA, also proceeding from the Spanish Bank. They are less shocking than those of the town halls, but also they have his that one.
Let's begin for the 9 most inhabited CCAA, and let's see his debt in thousands of euros from the year 1994 until today. They know already, click in the graph to see it well.

In absolute terms, the biggest debt quantity corresponds to Catalonia followed by the Valencian Community, Madrid and Andalusia. The biggest recent increase looks like that of Catalonia, but it would be necessary to highlight also the notable growth of the Valencian debt from the beginning of the series.

In any case, as I remembered already in the note on the town halls, it is convenient to see these numbers in relative terms, well bearing in mind the population or the capacity of generation of wealth of every CCAA. For the above mentioned we have a relatively vague indicator (but it is what exists), the regional GDP. Fortunately, the Spanish Bank offers us the series of debt in percentage of the above mentioned GDP. Here they have them, for the same 9 more inhabited CCAA (1).

Catalonia leaves the first place, there it being transferred the Valencian Community, which current debt (to June, 2009) the esteem the Spanish Bank in 13,4 % of the GDP of the above mentioned community. Catalonia stays in an honorable place, with 11,8 %, and the recent subidón keeps on being observed, perhaps something previously to that of other CCAA. In the third place there would be Castilla-La Mancha (9,4 %), which seems to hurry up in reaching the podium. Later there come Gallicia (7,6 %), Madrid (6,1 %), Andalusia (5,9 %), Canaries (5,1 %), Castile and León (4 %) and the Basque Country (2 %), which is one of the communities that more has reduced his debt (this way measured) in the last 14 years, although, like all other, her increased in recent times.

In the third graph we see the debt in absolute terms of 8 remaining, less inhabited CCAA.

This second division (for population) heads his Balearics, with a very notable growth of his debt in the last period of five years, approximately. It follows him, like a rocket (with pardon for the easy prank) Aragon, and the third place occupies his Murcia.

Again, the logical thing is to see this information in relative terms, in this case, like ratio on the regional GDP.

We have a clear champion of this second division, Balearics (11,4 %), over a distance of La Rioja (7,8 %) and of a group in which Aragon, Extremadura and Navarre are, with information between 5 and 6 %, approximately. What more attracts attention of me on this second graph, in addition to the Balearic subidón, is the evolution of Navarre, which began the series with one ratio superior to 10 % and it finishes it with 5,2 %. Not bad.

If it comes to them well, next I gather a picture with the most recent information (those of June, 2009), arranged according to the ratio on the GDP.

That they is useful.
______
(1) I separate 17 CCAA in two groups (9 and 8) so that the graphs turn out to be better. I separate them for population, since it is the first thing that has occurred to me and it had more to hand.

The political class as problem of Spain in the barometers of CIS (curious graphs LXXXV)

Since they know, today CIS has published the results of his barometer of September, enough centred on questions of privacy in Internet and in other ambiences. Throw a glance.
I have made use of the new information to update a series that I have never published in Wonkapistas, although his moment can have come. It is a question of several series that gather the mentions to problems relative to the political class (political parties, the politicians, the government, the corruption and the fraud...) since they can be traced easily in Internet, this is, from autumn 1994. I prepared these series as answer to a track that a reader (Víctor Marín) happened to me, alerting me of a possible increase of the mention of the political problems in the classic question of CIS on three principal problems of Spain.
Certainly, when one starts examining this question he realizes that it is necessary to consider a set of answers and that not always CIS has codified in the same way the answers relative to what we might name the political class as problem. In the end, there does not stay any more remedy to gather all these codifications in the same graph to see if we do an idea to ourselves how the things are changing. Here they have it (they know already, click in him to extend it).

Really, the spontaneous mentions codified like "the political class, the political parties" go growing for something more about one year, although about the spring 2007 they were in a level perhaps top. Also they are raising the mentions to "the government, the politicians and the parties". The same way they tend to raise the mentions to "the corruption and the fraud", although they continue in levels bajísimos (1,2 % in September, 2009), having reached top levels in recent times (near to 3 % at the end of 2006).
Although there could not be planned backwards a strict evolution of the first two series, we count with similar others: "political problems" and "political crisis / situation". Both suggest that the mention of this type of problems was very top in 1994/1995, which does not wonder, since we were in a situation of quasipermanent political crisis: a government of the Spanish socialist party in minority, governing an immersed country in a very deep economic crisis, and flooded in an endless series of scandals of political corruption, or more serious (case GAL).
In fact, one of the series yes has certain continuity, that of the mentions of the corruption and the fraud. Apparently it reached maximum levels (33 %) in January, 1995 and it was supported, to the fall, in relatively high levels until February, 1996 (21 %), just before the general elections of March of this year.
Anyhow, although we could not establish the continuity of the series with clarity (but yes, more or less, in case of the corruption), we know that we are provided with the classic question in which the interviewee expresses a judgment on the political situation (very bad, bad, regular, good, very good). It is easy to construct an indicator with this question from February, 1995.
In this occasion, unlike the graphs of political tendencies that I have published other times, the indicator of political situation is constructed this way: % of "very bad" + % of "bad" - % of "good" - % of "very good". This way, the worse the political situation, the more it raises the indicator, and vice versa. It see in the following graph, which includes the information of the previous graph more this new series.

Since they can verify, the indicator of political situation transmits, grosso way, the same information as the already commented set of indicators, since it seems to be correlated well with them. In recent times, the perception of the political situation has deteriorated significantly, so that, measured with the indicator about which we speak, it would be in his worst level (46 %) from January, 1996 (52 %). Of course, he still has left enough to come to the maximum historically, of June, 1995 (65). Bets are admitted...

Use of the cannabis and securing of a university title

Yesterday, the Delegation of the Government for the National Plan on Drugs presented II report on the cannabis. Apparently, during the presentation, if we have to pay attention to what they have gathered the newspapers, I protect Sánchez, expert in addictions and one of the writers of the report affirmed (or this way it was understood by the journalists who gathered his affirmations, which everything can be) that, according to international studies, only 2 % of those who have consumed cannabis in his life obtains a university title, opposite to 30 % (or 38 %, according to the source) of those who have never consumed it.
I say already to them that I do not know if it is a question of an affirmation of the expert or of the shift journalist understanding, but the difference is so showy that outsider sounds, especially in view of the panorama of consumption of cannabis in any faculties.
Let's see what the original source says, II report on the cannabis:

In a study of pursuit of 1265 children for 25 years realized in New Zealand, it was demonstrated that there was an association as per statistics significant between the consumption of Cannabis of way dose - clerk and a major risk of abandonment of the studies, of defeat in the access to the university and of finishing the university studies prematurely (Fergusson et to., 2008). In this study, 1,9 % of the students who achieved to obtain a university title had a high consumption of Cannabis (more than 400 times before 21 years) opposite to 35,9 % of the students who obtained a university title and had never consumed Cannabis.

It is clear: no? No, skylight that not. If we pay attention to the writing we will conclude that 1,9 % of those who obtain university title has a high cannabis consumption, while 35,9 % of these alumni has never consumed it. But this is something different from what the expert said.
Let's see, then, the original study of the one that the information obtains, that of Fergusson et to. (2008), which is: Fergusson, David M. and Joseph M. Boden. 2008. "Cannabis uses and later life outcomes", Addiction, 103, 6: 969-976. They can consult the summary here, but the article is not free free. The information to which there refers the report on that we comment comes from the picture 1 of the article. They are gathered in the following picture.

Now yes it is a little clearer. What says the study is that, between the born in 1977 in the Christchurch locality, New Zealand, the biggest frequency of use of cannabis between 14-21 years, measured across surveys and turned into the number of times that consumed it in these 7 years, collaborates clearly with a minor securing of a university title at the age of 25 years. Those who less obtain it are those that more cannabis has consumed (400 times or more in the mentioned ages), since only their 1,9 % obtains it. Those who have more success, with 35,9 % of qualifications, are those who have never consumed cannabis. That there are two groups to which the informations seem to refer. It is obvious that that of 1,95 % all the cannabis consumers do not form, but only the very frequent ones.
In fact, for the set of consumers of cannabis, the qualifications valuation is 21,5 %.
The true thing is that yes an effect seems to be observed between the consumption of cannabis and the university success. In fact, even controlling the influence of other possible factors that can influence the academic achievement (1), not cannabis consumers had a probability of completing university studies four times superior to that of the very frequent consumers, although not 18 times Superior as he suggests the picture that we have seen.
Anyway, I hope that, more or less, the information should remain this way clear. After all, they are told itself by a university student who has not consumed cannabis in his life :-)
_____________
(1). Age of the mother, educational level of the mother, familiar socioeconomic status when there was born the subject, standard of familiar life (age 0), exhibition to sexual or physical abuses during the childhood, familiar adversity, use of illicit drugs for someone of parents, crime of someone of the parents, alcoholism of some of the parents, problems of conduct (7-13 years), problems of attention (7-9 years), I consume 10 of alcohol (15-21 years), association with problematic pairs (15-21 years), you notice in the school (11-13 years), I use of other illegal drugs, between others.

"Of the extrapolation of the malfunction", or "this sample is not representative"

Since they will know, the pharmacist Lilly and the Association for the Investigation of Sexual Malfunctions in Primary health care (AIDS-AP) have made a study public on sexual life and sexual ailments of the Spanish males. In the press release (I have not found the study in the web), they refer all the time to the Spanish men, on having presented the results, as if the survey on which the study is based was representative of the Spanish males, of those of 18 to 95 years, in this case. One of the information most spread by the newspapers is that of 42 % "of the Spanish men" that he endures of erectile malfunction.
In the press release it is not said to us much any more how the sample is obtained. There is mentioned this criterion, which 720 centers have informed for the whole Spain and which has been selected to males from 18 to 95 years. It is not said to us, for example, when the field work has taken place. Yes one mentions that 58 % had 50 years or more.
In fact, the survey cannot be representative. The sample is obtained of the males who come to a primary health care consultation for any motive, but not all the males come to the primary health care doctor with the same frequency. For example, it goes away more to the doctor as the age increases, as it can be verified easily with the information of the last National Survey of Health, of the INE, corresponding to 2006. Then, it had come to a medical consultation in the last four weeks 61 % of the 75-year-old males or more, but only 22 % of the from 18 to 24. Also, independently of the age, which are healthier will go less to the doctor that those who are more rotten.
In spite of little information that they offer, they are enough two of them to realize that the sample is not representative.
On one hand, if out, the percentage of 50-year-old individuals or more it would be 38 %, as it can be calculated by the information of estimations of the current population (on January 1, 2009) of the INE, and not of 58 % as they affirm. Since it was necessary to wait, bearing in mind the rules of assistance to the doctor for ages, his sample is too "old".
On the other hand, probably for the same reason (that of a too high middle age) or for the reason of that those who more come are the least healthy, another fact also suggests that the sample is not representative. They say in the press release that 39 % was enduring arterial hypertension. Nevertheless, in the National Survey of Health already said (ENS), of three years ago, the males (16 years or more) that were declaring to have arterial hypertension were 17 % or 19 %, according to the indicator that is used. Many less, in any case. (1)
Take this study (good, this press release) as an example of the problematic thing of extrapolating to the set of the population the obtained information of the public who comes to the doctor, especially to study behaviors or characteristics, in this case, illnesses clearly associated with the frequency of assistance with the medical consultations.
________
(1) Also they say that to 22 % of the interrogated persons it imputes "the illness of the prostate". With the ENS we know that they say to have problems of prostate diagnosed by a doctor 7 % of the 16-year-old males or more, this is, a third. Diabetes would have 16 % of Lilly's study, opposite to 6 % in the ENS. And 37 % would have the high cholesterol, for 15 % in the ENS.

Economic problems and of political class in the surveys of CIS, 1985-2009 (curious graphs LXXXVI)

Since they know, CIS has done publics today the results of the barometer corresponding to October, 2009. On having checked them and having updated the series that I continue, I have realized that they have begun to publish a table with the information of the question by three principal problems of Spain and that it goes back 1985. Those that Wonkapistas continues know that I have prepared long series on some of these problems, like the immigration or the housing, or, very recently, on the problems relative to the political class. Now, CIS gives us the made work, and it is already not necessary to go consulting the results of the barometers one for one to complete the series that we are interested in. Very kind.
Making use of this new tool, next I offer them a few graphs that can be interesting to place in perspective diacrónica some of the most excellent problems in the current moment of economic crisis and political crisis.
First, a graph with the principal economic problems.

Since they see, the mention of the unemployment as one of three principal problems of Spain was maximum partly of the eighties and probably at the beginning of the nineties. It fell down clearly from 1997 till the end of the year 2000, it was supported later and fell down again enough from the beginning of 2004. With the new crisis, the mentions of the unemployment have grown with rapidity, up to being located in new maximum, low, anyhow, to those of the eighties.
The truth is that the mention of the unemployment continues very closely (big finding!) the evolution of the valuation of unemployment, since they can verify in the following graph.
In the last long decade, the mention of the unemployment has moved inversely that of the problems of housing, which were climbing to "top 3" of the Spanish problems as the unemployment valuation was falling down and the prices of the housing were growing. And something similar happens with the " problems "of the employment", that, I believe, usually groups questions as those of an excessive presence of temporary contracts.
The mentions of problems that remain labeled as "of economic nature" also continue closely the evolution of the business cycles. Anyhow, it is interesting to see how these mentions are falling down in the last months, although the unemployment does not diminish and the crisis I had not just abated.
Probably, it is explained because other problems, not economic, are climbing to "top 3". Perhaps those that they affect to the political class, as it happened in 1994/1995 and it happens now.

I have supported the scale 0 to 100 of the axis of arranged so that they could appreciate of a glance that the mentions of problems of the political class, as CIS has codified and unified them in three series, turn pale before the mentions of economic problems. In spite of everything, the evolution is observed relatively well: maximum levels in the 1993/1995 political crisis, especially in what concerns the corruption, relatively low levels later, up to the rise of last months, and the quite clear increase in the last barometer of the mentions to the corruption, which have happened from the 1,4 to 5,1 %. Given the panorama of scandals of corruption that they affect to the principal parties, it would be no wonder that this number kept on climbing in the next months. Anyway, that those of CIS have behaved. Now only it is missing that they give us tracks of how they do the kitchen of estimation of vote ;-)

Valuations of legal abortion for nationalities in 2008

The Ministry of Health has published today his annual report on the voluntary interruption of the pregnancy with information of the year 2008. It is the first year in which they include pictures with the nationality of the women who abort legally in Spain. We were already provided with information of this type for some region (Madrid, for example), as I have commented one day. Now we can measure, with some vagueness, this aspect to national scale.
For the prompt thing, it is convenient to remember some numbers. In 2008, 115.812 legal abortions were carried out in Spain. Of them, 113.780 correspond to women who were residing in Spanish territory, and 2.032 to not resident women. It is necessary to imagine that between not residents, foreign women are the immense majority, but we cannot be sure because of 1.050 of not residents the nationality does not consist.
Of 113.780 abortions carried out by resident women, we know that 51.088 were corresponding to Spanish women, 49.258 to foreign women and of 13.434 the nationality does not consist. Namely of that the nationality consists, more or less, the half they are Spanish and the half they are foreign. Obviously, since we know that in Spain there are no so many foreign women like Spanish in fertile age, that means that, as we knew, the foreigners who live here are sobrerrepresentadas between those who abort legally in Spain.
To know it, the best thing is to calculate the abortion valuations for nationality and for ages. I have taken the information of the women's abortions from 15 to 44 years of resident women (112.932), which the report of the Department presents divided in stretches of age of five years and I have calculated the valuations on the population from the information of the municipal Electoral roll on January 1, 2008, since it contains the most approximate numbers of Spanish and foreign women. The results appear in the following picture, which they will see better if they click on him (1).

Apparently the abortions valuation (number of abortions for thousand women) for the Spaniards from 15 to 44 years is 6 for thousand, while that of the foreigners is 31,4 for thousand, that is to say, 5 times more, a number similar to the one that I calculated in 2005 for the Community of Madrid. The highest valuation between the foreigners her present the women proceeding from the Sub-Saharan Africa (61,8 for thousand) and the lowest those of North America (11,5 for thousand).
In the following graph the valuations are represented by ages. Perhaps some differences are appreciated better (if they extend it clicking, skylight).

These calculations are approximate: we would lack for assigning the nationality of residents for that it does not consist and perhaps the percentage of registered women changes for region of the world of origin. Nevertheless, to little that they are minimally reasonable, they show us that the nationality of the women who abort is a fundamental factor to understand this phenomenon, and, in his case, to confront it from the civil society or from the public administrations. This was something known, and of it I have realized several times in the blog, but traditionally it has not been born in mind in the analyses of the phenomenon in Spain, that there have preferred to be fixed on variables as the condition of employed of the woman. Now the thing is clear.
_________ (1) The groups for nationalities are those that the Ministry of Health uses, that they coincide with those that the INE uses, except in case of the African ones, which I have grouped. In North Africa I have included the women of Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia (Libya was not differing in the information of the INE). The rest of women of Africa has been included by me in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The crisis as "priest" of the labor "instability" in Spain

One of the curious effects of the deep crisis in which it continues immersed our economy is that it has reduced very significantly one of the negative features that are usually imputed to our labor market. Some call it "precarización", others simply speak about an excess of employed storms compared to the countries of our European environment. As I already aimed in another note, somewhere near April of this year, as the storms are the first ones in paying the duck of the crisis, at this percentage (or this precarización) it is falling down rapidly. Only on having revised these days the information for my classes, I have realized the rapid thing that is falling down. Let's see it, how not, with a few graphs (they know already, they click in them to see them in all his splendor).
In the first one we distinguish temporary and indefinite wage earners both for the private sector and for the public. In him we can observe the enormous magnitude of the reduction of the number of employed storms in the private sector in the last years. From the maximum of 4,8 millions in the third trimester of 2006 it has passed to the current number of 3,2 millions. Namely it has diminished in 1,5 millions. On the contrary, the indefinite private employment reached his top in the second trimester of 2008, with 9,7 millions, number that has fallen down up to 9,3 millions at present.

Recently the public employment has continued a keynote very different from the private one, so much the indefinite one (basically: officials) like the storm. It can be said that in both cases it has kept on growing during the crisis.
If we see it in percentage terms (following graph), the panorama is clearer. The temporality in the private sector grew enormously in the eighties, to root, especially, of the biggest facility for these contracts that happened with a new legislation in 1984. It went over to the first maximum of 39,2 % in the third trimester of 1992 and to a new maximum of 40,9 % in the second one of 1995, after the crisis of the nineties, in which the fall of the indefinite employment was even more intense than that of the storm. Since then, the temporality in the private sector fell down gradually until the year 2003 (34 %), probably because of the elimination in 1994 (if I do not resemble badly) from any of the facility to the temporary hiring and of the establishment in 1997 of a new type of indefinite contracts, which were enduring a minor inappropriate severance pay, and to which one was coming across the temporary hiring. The last boom of the construction, of 2004 to 2006/07 perhaps is the person in charge of that was recovering the storms valuation in these dates, returning at levels of 36 % in the third trimester of 2006.

Since then, the collapse has been noisy, there being reached a minimum of 25,2 % in the second trimester of 2009 and of 25,8 % in the third trimester. Which carries us back a year 1988, four years after the beginning of the blast-off of the temporality.

In the public sector the history has been different, since in the whole period that we never consider the percentage of storms has fallen down. It grew rapidly in the eighties, it was supported in the first half of the nineties and grew again, persistently, until the year 2005, moment in which there was reached, more or less, a percentage similar to the current one, of 26,2 %, showily superior to the private one.

Does the recent fall of the temporality owe only to what has happened in the construction? The majority yes, but not only. Let's see what has happened in three sectors most linked to the business cycle: industry, construction and services, without distinguishing in this occasion if it is a question of private or public wage earners.

In the industry, the absolute fall level of temporary and indefinite is very similar, although a rupture in the way of classifying the occupied ones by branches prevents a precise calculation. If we concentrate on what it has spent from the first trimester of 2008, the employed indefinite ones have spent from 2,3 to 2,0 millions (263.000 work places get lost, 11 %) and the storms have made it from 645.000 to 367.500 (278.000 work places get lost, 43 %). Obviously, the fall has been much more intense between the storms.

In the construction, the thing is much clearer. If three years ago were clearly more the storms that the indefinite ones, now have turned the returns. From the first trimester of 2008 the indefinite ones have spent from 1,0 to 0,8 millions (222.000 work places get lost, 21 %), while the storms have fallen down from 1,1 to 0,6 millions (getting lost 43 % 478.000 work places,). The fall has been much more pronounced between the second ones.

Finally, let's see what has happened in the sector services. Let's remember that here the presence of the public sector is notable. From the first trimester of 2008, the indefinite employment has risen from the 8,2 up to 8,6 millions (355.000 work places are gained) and the storm has spent from 3,0 to 2,8 millions (getting lost 204.000 work places). Again, it is very clear that the worst part has taken the temporary employment.

In the end, the fall in the percentage of storms has happened in three considered sectors, as one sees in the following graph. Therefore, the reduction of the "instability" does not owe only to the construction, although yes in enough measured.

Anyway, with that the crisis lasts some trimesters more, to this step, we finish with the problem of the temporality in Spain. Not because the storms turn and indefinite, but because we expel them from the market... They know already, which is not consoled...

Wonkapistas wishes them Happy Christmas

And, skylight, continuing with an inveterate tradition, also themselves is it wished by my girls, who this year have elected as a motive the snowmen (one of them Eskimo???).

Seriously, that have a few holidays full of happiness and that next year comes everything fulfilled with goods that allows us the crisis.

Not - nis Spanish in 2009

Yesterday, fattening a few hundreds of grams more with a roscón and a chocolate shared with a few neighbors (accumulating share capital, I mean), we were commenting on the situation of an assumption new type of young man, which neither works neither studies, does not even strain for looking for work. He lives with his parents, who support him and pay some or many luxuries to him, but it does not strain for a future, good are worked forming, well acquiring labor experience. Apparently, they call them "not - nis" (they neither study they do not even work), and, also apparently, it would be a worrying, increasing and quite widespread phenomenon.
Yes that is worrying. It does not seem that I benefited him very much to a country to be provided with many people like that, with: parasites? voluntary or involuntary. Is it increasing? It does not even design. Is it quite widespread? The latter question we can try to answer it with the available information, this is, those of the files of microinformation of the Survey of Active Population (that can discharge here).
In the following picture I gather several young people categories from 16 to 34 years that we might consider "not - nis".
For the prompt thing, I do not include to those who in the survey are considered to be "a person of reference" or "spouse of the person of reference", this is, to that, in principle, they are those who head the hearths. And so, I concentrate almost exclusively on the "children of the person of reference", although, for mor of the finished thing, I include other categories of dependent young people (like "couple or spouse of the son of the person of reference"), very minority.
I do not also include the idle ones that have already worked. It is possible that now they are stopped (do not work) and do not study, but they have already showed in practice his disposal to work, and it is possible that they are unemployed responding to the demands of the moment, in spite of his efforts to find work.
Then, from the point of view of the employment, we would have left like possible members of the group of "not - nis" the inactive ones and stopped without previous employment. The inactive ones are those who neither are occupied they do not even look for work (that is to say, even they nor qualify like stopped). Stopped without previous employment they are those who have never worked but they are looking for work.
From the point of view of the studies, it would be necessary to bear in mind to those who do not study ruled studies and/or do not study not ruled studies. As often we think that "studying" is to study ruled studies, also I include to those who only continue a not ruled formation.
In the picture there are offered different combinations of the above mentioned categories (click in him to extend it, then, if not, they will not see anything).

In puridad, "not - nis" there would be the inactive ones that neither study ruled studies they do not even continue a not ruled formation. Those approximately 370.000 would be ó 380.000 young people from 16 to 34 years in the first half of the year (3 % of the whole), although they would raise approximately 620.000 in the third trimester of 2009 (5 %). I believe that the fact of the third trimester is not good, because the survey covers July, August and September, in which there are many students who have finished (or left) his studies, but they are not initiating a few new studies yet or do not looking for work, anything that they usually do, rather in September or October. That's why, from now on I will not use the numbers of the third trimester.
If we add the inactive ones that only continue a not ruled formation, the number of "not - nis" would promote approximately 550.000 (4,5 %).
If we add stopped without previous employment that they do not study, the number would raise approximately 680.000 (5,6 %).
If we add stopped without previous employment that only they continue a not ruled formation, the number would raise approximately 710.000 (6 %).
In the picture they have other combinations. Choose the one that more they like. Or, if they want, propose a different estimation :-)

The public deficit of 12 % in "historical" perspective (curious graphs LXXXVII)

This morning, Ángel Laborda, the director of the Office of Conjuncture and Statistics of the Foundation of the Savings banks (Funcas), has affirmed that the public deficit of this year (and of the one that comes) would be located probably in 12 % of the GDP. A drove of donkeys, we go, not what Laborda has said, but the size of the deficit. So that they place this "drove of donkeys" in a certain historical perspective, in the following graph they have the public deficit from the year 1970.

The lowest thing that "we had fallen down" was, more or less, up to 7 % in 1995. Then we take almost a decade in re-balancing, more or less, the public accounts. We will see what happens next years, which will be of slow economic growth.

So that they have a more finished information, the following graph gathers the expenses and the income of the public administrations in percentage of the GDP, also from 1970, although only until 2008.

In the number 213 of Notebooks of Economic information during whose presentation Laborda has done these affirmations, the estimation of the deficit that he (together with Maria Jesus Fernández) was doing himself age of 10,5 % of the GDP, from a few public income of 35,4 % and a few expenses of 45,9 %. It does not seem, since that we are going to reach the levels of public expenditure of 1993 (49,6 %), although it is never known...

The crisis is already evident (a little) in the emancipation of the children

One of the effects esperables of an economic crisis as deep as the current one is that the children stretch to leave the paternal hearth later. Perhaps the principal factor is the valuation of juvenile unemployment, although it can take control also of the sensation ambience that the things go badly and, already it is known, in turbulent times better not to risk.
In Spain something similar begins being observed already. With information of the Survey of Active Population we can calculate, grosso way, the emancipation valuation for males and young women in different ages. The emancipated ones would be all those individuals represented in the survey who do not belong to the category of children or daughters of the person of reference of the hearth. If we divide his number by the whole of women / males of every stretch of age, we have an emancipation valuation. If it rises, the young people leaves earlier the nest; if it goes down, the opposite. Let's see what happens.
First, the case of the males. In the following graph we observe the behavior of the valuation of emancipation of the males in three stretches of age (20 to 24, 25 to 29 and 30 to 34) from 1987 up to the actuality. Since it is verified, this valuation fell down in all the stretches up to minimums that were located, according to the age, in the year 2000 or in 2003. Later it climbed, partly (only partly) like reflex of the foreigners' biggest presence in these ages. The ascent was quite notable in the stretch from 25 to 29, since it passed from minimums near to 31 % to maxima of 47 %.

The crisis seems to have stopped this ascent or, even, it to have re-spilled in the stretches from 20 to 24 and from 25 to 29, but it does not seem to be evident in the from 30 to 34 yet.

In case of the women, a similar trajectory is observed, although at top emancipation levels.

The same way, the crisis seems to have stopped or re-spilled the ascent of the emancipation in the women from 20 to 24 and from 25 to 29, but it is not clear that it has done it in the stretch of top age.

The change rhythm does not make to wait that should become prompt in the youngest stretches to the minimal valuations of the ends of the XXth century, and that there keeps on being foreign young people in these age stretches does improbably that it turns again to these valuations, but free me God of doing predictions. Those yes that the devil loads them.

The perception of situation economic Spanish as three sources

We are provided, at least, with three survey sources to continue the perception of the Spanish about the economic situation, so much the current one (compared to the past) like the future one (that of next year).
The most long series is that of the consumers' Survey of the European Union, prepared by the DG of Economic and Financial Matters (DG ECFIN) and it has information from 1986 (information, methodology). It is used to prepare an indicator of confidence of the consumer. The survey is carried out monthly on a sample representative of the 16-year-old population or more, which one interviews in the domicile. The size of the sample belongs to approximately 2.000 individuals. The question on the current situation says something like (my translation): How does he believe that it has changed the general economic situation in the country into last twelve months?. And it admits the answers: it has improved very much, has improved a little, has remained equal, has deteriorated a little, has deteriorated very much, ns/nc. The question on the future says this way (also my translation): How does he hope that the general economic situation should develop in this country in the next twelve months?. And it is answered: it will improve very much, will improve a little, will remain equal, will deteriorate a little, will deteriorate very much, ns/nc.
The second series, for duration, is the one that comes from the monthly barometers of CIS (information, methodology), with information from 1996. This survey is applied monthly (less August) to a sample representative of the 18-year-old population or more, which one interviews in his domicile. The size of the sample almost comes to 2.500 individuals. The question on the current situation is: Referring to the general economic situation of Spain: how would you qualify it?. And it admits the answers: very good, good, regular, bad, very bad, ns/nc. The question on the future says: And: do you believe that in one year the economic situation of the country will be better, equal or worse than now?. The answers: better, equal, worse, ns/nc.
The shortest series is that of the Institute of Official Credit (information, methodology), with information from September, 2004. It is used to prepare an indicator of confidence of the consumer. Also it is applied monthly, to a sample of 1.000 16-year-old individuals or more, which one interviews by phone. The first 400 interviews do to themselves individuals who already answered the survey six months earlier. 600 remaining ones complete the sample. The question on the current situation is: Do you think that the current situation of the Spanish economy is better or worse than six months ago?. It is answered her, seems: better, equal, worse, ns/nc. The question on the future says: Do you think that the situation of the Spanish economy in six months will be better or worse than the current one?. And it is answered: better, equal, worse, ns/nc.
Apparently the questions are not identical, although they tend to measure, some, a judgment on the current situation of the Spanish, economy implicit or explicitly compared with that of the past, and others, an expectation on the future evolution, to one year or to half a year. The samples are quite similar in age terms, although not for his making or for the method of data capture (one is telephone, others two are attend them).
With these questions, three organizations prepare their own indicators, generally for a procedure that, basically, implies adding the positive answers and reducing the denials, considering both types of answers as the grade of positividad or negative attitude (great, small...), in his case. The DG ECFIN for his part, presents the corrected seasonal nature information, what does not happen in others two cases.
Like result, we have three different indexes for each of two measurements (current situation, future situation), with not compatible measurements between themselves, although the graphs of evolution of these measurements, in the first one (or second) glance, suggest that the indexes move in a similar way and, therefore, grosso way, they measure the same.
In two following graphs I offer them a comparison of these indexes for the period that they have in common (September, 2004 to January, 2010), making use that the last monthly information has published recently (those of CIS, today; those of the ICO, yesterday; those of the DG ECFIN a few days ago). To be able to compare them better, I have converted all the indexes to the same base, which costs 100 in September, 2004. That does not mean that they are perfectly comparable, but they it are more than if we had them with his original values.

We begin for the indicator of the current situation. They know already, click in the graph to extend it.

The history that three indicators count is, basically the same one, with some change. The perception is supported in similar levels until, more or less, June or July, 2007. Since then, it deteriorates very much, even minimal levels (historically, how it can be verified by the information of the DG ECFIN, and as I showed in times), more rapid in the series of the ICO than in others two. Later two becomes stable in very low levels, earlier in case of the ICO, later in others, or, in case of the ICO, it returns at slightly top levels, still much underneath of those of September, 2004.

The history also is similar, with his variants, for the case of the expectations on the future economic situation.

Again, these expectations remain more or less stable for almost three years until they begin falling down, more or less, about June / July, 2007. It does not look like a fall so marked as that of the perception of the current situation, although, of paying attention to the series of the DG ECFIN, it was in charge to the indicator to historical minimums. Neither it seems so continued. In this case, the odd man out looks like the series of CIS, traveling more rhythmically between themselves two remaining ones. In any case, they all reflect a recovery of the expectations from beginnings of 2009, more or less when the judgment on the current situation had touched fund (or it was on the point of doing it). The people must have thought that to worse impossible age to go...

This recovery stopped and the indicators seem to have become stable in levels very near to those of the beginning of the period that we consider here.

Now it touches you, readership, to interpret all this. They can be fixed, as many do, in the noise of one or two monthly information or to adopt an a little more distant perspective. They already know which it is me who prefers.

More on the emancipation of the young people in Spain

Another day was aiming that perhaps the crisis was evident in the emancipation of the young people in Spain (1). The truth is that the changes were minimal, therefore I did not dare to do incisive affirmations. My caution after the percentages of emancipated young people interpret also owes to the great thing that has changed the composition of the population into the ages that he was analyzing (20 to 34 years) in the last decade. The percentage of foreigners has grown significantly in these cohorts. As the percentage of "emancipated" between them is substantially higher that between the Spanish, the most probable thing is that the increase of the emancipation from the year 2000, aproximadamentzá, has been due partly, simply, to the fact that there is more foreign young people. The same way, if now the emancipation valuation has become stable or, even, seems to fall down, perhaps it depends also on that the number of foreign young people does not grow already so much.
With the files of microinformation of the EPA we can calculate the emancipation valuations for the Spanish young people and for the foreigners (those who have foreign nationality and those who have double nationality, then, to these effects, are very similar). For example, for the 4th trimester of 2009, the information is the following ones.
Spain (4th trimester of 2009). Emancipation valuation for sexes, ages and nationality
TotalEspañolesExtranjerosVarones
From 20 to 24 16,511,743,5De 25 to 29 45,635,586,2De 30 to 34 76,270,496,4Mujeres
From 20 to 24 26,017,763,7De 25 to 29 60,550,990,4De 30 to 34 84,480,796,6Fuente: proper making with information of the EPA.
For example, if 35,5 % of the Spanish males does not live with his parents, this percentage promotes 86,2 % in case of the foreigners. It does not have to surprise: almost all his parents remain in his fatherlands.
Then, the evolution of the global valuation of emancipation can be deceitful: it is possible that it was increasing, but only because the percentage of foreigners increased. Let's see.
I have calculated the emancipation valuations for Spanish and foreigners, for sexes, from the year 1999 to 2009, the period of calculation that allow the microinformation of the EPA, only available on the web page of the INE without need to request them. I have done it for the 4th trimester of every year, not to lose too much time. They have the result in two following graphs (click in them to extend them).
In the first one referred to the males, we see how the fall in the valuation of emancipation of the Spanish young people that is observed from 1987 (and that, in fact, begins probably at the end of the seventies), was even more pronounced in the stretches from 25 to 29 and 30 to 34 years of what the global information suggests (that include the foreigners). Nevertheless, also we can verify how the later recovery has not owed only to the foreigners' biggest presence, since the emancipation of the Spanish also has increased. Perhaps less.

The graph also suggests that the apparent current fall in the emancipation valuation in the stretch from 25 to 29 yes seems to apply the Spanish to himself, but it is not clear that from 20 to 24 could say the same to himself for the stretch.
In case of the women (following graph), the recent fall in the stretch from 20 to 24 does not seem to have to do with the Spaniards, and neither the fall is clear in the stretch from 25 to 29. Rather the information suggests a stagnation.

Finally, I would be even more cautious than another day. It will be necessary to wait for some trimesters (or years) more to notice clearly the effects of the crisis in the abandonment of the paternal nest of the Spanish young people.
____
(1) Remember that I define as emancipated all that young people who do not turn out to be classified like "son of the person of reference" under the EPA.

1.500 deaths less for the Law antitobacco of 2005?

Apparently, according to that they have presented a study of the Spanish Society of Epidemiology on the effects of the law antitobacco of 2005, or according to the journalists who have been present at the presentation, which is never known, the above mentioned law has served to us to reduce in 1.500 the annual deaths related to the consumption of tobacco. Will it be true?
To verify it, we have the finished text of the study, which gentilmente the SEE provides on his web page. Look, look in the text for an incisive affirmation as that of the avoidance of 1.500 deaths. They will not find it. More that they will find in the conclusions of the chapter on the effects of the law for the health it is:

The coming into effect of the Law looks like 28/2005 that it has had effects benefciosos for the health of the general population, in terms of a reduction of the hospitable income for sharp infarction of myocardium and of the respiratory morbidity of not smoking workpeople of the sector of the hotel trade.

And in the conclusions of the study:

5. The law has had a positive impact in the health, específcamente in the reduction of the respiratory symptoms in the workpeople of the hotel trade. Also, there is preliminary information that suggest a reduction of the cases of infarction of myocardium in the general population.

It "seems", "he suggests that". And no number in the conclusions. And in the text? What is the substance on which there are based these conclusions and, in particular, the affirmation of 1.500 avoided deaths? The following one, a substance more ethereal than the smoke of the tobacco (my bold faces):

To complement this information about morbidity there appears an estimation of the mortality attributable to the consumption of tobacco, for general population> = 35 years, assuming a hypothetical stage with a reduction of the predominance due to the law. This way, if the current decreasing tendency was hastening thanks to the Law 28/2005, and if the predominance in the year 2010 would lower approximately 20 % in relative terms, the mortality attributable to the nicotinism would be provided with 1070 deaths less in men and 289 in women (Table 5.1). In a similar way, if the exhibition predominance in the men between 35 and 64 years was supported HAT hypothetically in the hearths and was diminishing 80 % in relative terms in the labor ambience, the mortality attributable to HAT would descend in 121 annual deaths, while in the women of the same stripe of age, assuming a relative descent of 25 % (since they depart from a predominance of minor exhibition), the attributable mortality would descend to 51 deaths (Table 5.1). In a joint way, the reduction in the consumption of tobacco and in the exhibition would have to HAT an impact of 1482 deaths less a year.

Know that HAT is not a hat, but Environmental Smoke of the Tobacco.
How they see for the bold faces, it is a question of a hypothetical stage, foreseen for 2010, in case certain assumptions were fulfilled. Or, nothing referred to what has happened, but to what might happen. And, in any case, the information would mix two effects: that of the fall previous to the law and that of the hypothetical extra fall.
The best thing is that the fundamental assumption (the one that implies the fall of a major number of deaths), of extra reduction of the predominance of the consumption of tobacco, is not supported not with the information of the proper study. In the chapter dedicated to the effects of the law in the predominance of the consumption of tobacco it ends (my bold faces):

With the available information at present, the results do not suggest any impact of the Law 28/2005 on the indicators of consumption of tobacco. In general, the descent in the smokers' predominance and in the number of emaciated cigarets, as well as the increase of the abandonment of the tobacco, they reflect a continuation of the temporary evolution in short and half term observed before the coming into effect of the law.

Repeat with me: "no impact of the Law 28/2005 on the indicators of consumption of tobacco". The tendency to the fall is before to the law and it has been supported later without detectable changes.
Then: on what are they based to depart from the hypothesis of which the law will accelerate the fall in the predominance? In nothing. They suppose it and it is already.
Then they want that we trust in the scientists...